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Introduction

B. Jessie Hill†
It would be no exaggeration to say that struggles over executive
discretion are as old as the executive itself. Yet, it is also a favorite
canard of pundits and talking heads on both sides of the political
spectrum to claim that recent administrations have engaged in powergrabbing that is both unprecedented and in excess of constitutional
limits.1 Rarely are such claims examined in careful and studious detail,
as the authors of this Symposium have done.
Controversies over the Obama Administration’s actions (or, in
some cases, declared inaction) on immigration, the Affordable Care Act,
marijuana, and recess appointments have reminded us that executive
discretion and the potential for executive overreaching extend beyond
the international affairs and national security arenas. Recently, tension
between Congress and the President became particularly visible when
a federal district court preliminarily enjoined President Obama’s
“Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents.”2 Though only a preliminary ruling, the decision charged
that the administration’s newly announced policy not to deport a
particular category of deportable immigrants, issued in the face of
congressional inaction on immigration reform, evinced “complete
abdication” of executive responsibility, “thwart[ing]” the will of
†

Judge Ben C. Green Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty
Development and Research, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law.

1.

See, e.g., Bill O’Reilly, Bill O’Reilly: Is President Obama Misusing His
Power? Talking Points (July 21, 2014), available at http://www.fox
news.com/transcript/2014/07/22/bill-oreilly-president-obama-misusinghis-power/ (suggesting that President Obama has abused the power of his
office in a way that is different from prior presidents’ abuses); Senator
Says Bush Is Acting Like “King George,” ABC News (Dec. 18, 2005),
available
at
http://www.foxnews.com/transcript/2014/07/22/bill
-oreilly-president-obama-misusing-his-power/ (quoting former Sen. Russ
Feingold as comparing President George W. Bush to a tyrannical
monarch).

2.

Texas v. United States, No. CIV. B-14-254, 2015 WL 648579, at *1, *62
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2015). Interestingly, the case was brought by twentysix states rather than by a representative of the legislative branch. Id. at *1.
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Congress and “not just rewriting the laws [but] . . . creating them from
scratch.”3
It is both the present salience and the enduring importance of the
issue of executive discretion that inspired this Symposium, which brings
together respected scholars in the fields of law and political science to
consider the role and limits of executive discretion in the administrative
state. Some of these scholars have taken a historical perspective,
demonstrating that the problem of executive power has been, and
remains, a central and perennial one in American democracy. Moreover,
the Articles in this Symposium confirm that facile characterizations of
one party’s or even one administration’s approach to the issue of
executive power fall woefully short of providing any descriptive power.
Instead, the story of executive discretion and its limits throughout
American history is a nuanced one, in which raw political imperatives
as well as high constitutional theory, informal norms, and long-term
rule-of-law considerations have all played a role.
One theme that weaves through many of the papers in this
Symposium is the importance of informal political constraints on Presidential power. For example, Dino P. Christenson, Assistant Professor
of Political Science at Boston University, and Douglas L. Kriner,
Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston University, flip the
conventional line of questioning on its head, and instead of asking why
Presidents seem to be acting unilaterally with greater and greater
frequency, they ask why Presidents do not do so more often, given the
relative lack of formal legal constraints on unilateral executive action.4
The answer, it turns out, is that informal political constraints play an
important—if not predominant—role in shaping Presidential decisionmaking. Using the case study of President Obama’s executive action on
immigration before the 2012 presidential election and his delay in acting
in advance of the 2014 midterms, Christenson and Kriner demonstrate
that the President acted unilaterally only when “the electoral benefits
of acting . . . outweighed the anticipated political costs of doing so.”5
Similarly, they demonstrate that President Obama’s decision to seek
congressional authorization before taking military action in Syria was
motivated by political rather than legal concerns.
Joseph White, Luxemberg Family Professor of Public Policy and
Chair of the Department of Political Science at Case Western Reserve
University, examines a more unusual occurrence: Congress handing

3.

Id. at *50.

4.

Dino P. Christenson & Douglas L. Kriner, Political Constraints on Unilateral Executive Action, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 897 (2015).

5.

Id. at 920.
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power back to the President to exercise according to his own prerogatives—specifically, by eliminating earmarks.6 The elimination of
congressional earmarks may profitably be viewed as an instance of
shifting power more than of streamlining the legislative process, because, as Professor White explains, “the issue is not whether there will
be programs with local benefits. The issue is who will decide which
localities benefit”—the President or Congress.7 Yet, just as Christenson
and Kriner found that informal checks drive executive self-restraint,
White attributes congressional self-restraint primarily to political
norms and the pressures of public opinion. The increasing visibility of
earmarks, combined with public distrust of legislators and the
legislative process, has led to a legislative reform that has turned out
to be both impactful and difficult to undo, if also largely counterproductive.
Zachary Price, Associate Professor at University of California
Hastings College of Law, places his focus on informal political
constraints on presidential inaction. In particular, Professor Price asks
how strong the norm of executive enforcement duty should be. He
concludes that it should be relatively robust, since citizens of all stripes
have an interest in ensuring that legislative achievements retain lasting
force beyond the administration in which they are enacted. In addition,
Professor Price contends that transparency, centralization, and
definiteness—though arguably desirable in most administrative
contexts—are detrimental to ensuring fidelity to statutory commands
in the agency enforcement context. Thus, both Price’s and White’s
contributions show that the nation’s long-term interest is not always
well-served when short-term concerns motivate the political branches
to take actions affecting the distribution of power between them.
Finally, Neal Devins, the Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor
of Government at the College of William and Mary, explores congressional oversight of the executive from yet another angle: congressional
participation in litigation as amicus curiae.8 In particular, he carefully
documents Congress’s transition from acting in a bipartisan manner to
protect institutional prerogatives against executive encroachment
during the 1970s and 1980s to asserting itself in more partisan ways
over the past decade, primarily by filing single-party amicus briefs in
litigation centering on social issues. Indeed, as Devins demonstrates,
6.

Joseph White, Jimmy Carter and James Miller’s Revenge: The Reasons
and the Consequences for Presidential and Congressional Power of
Measures to Ban Congressional “Earmarks,” 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
1175 (2015).

7.

Id. at 1182.

8.

Neal Devins, Measuring Party Polarization in Congress: Lessons from
Congressional Participation as Amicus Curiae, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
933 (2015).
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the bipartisan brief in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, argued in the Supreme
Court’s 2014 Term, is the “exception that proves the rule”: lawmakers
from both parties came together to file a brief supporting Congress’s
power to declare that parents whose children are born in Jerusalem
should be entitled to list Israel on the child’s passport in the face of a
State Department policy requiring the birthplace to be listed only as
“Jerusalem.”9 In that case, however, as Devins explains, the unifying
factor was most likely support for Israel, which both parties wished to
emphasize, rather than the power of Congress vis-à-vis the executive.
Thus, Devins’s article, too, supports the notion that party politics,
mostly of the short-term variety, drive important decisions in the
separation-of-powers realm.
Two of the contributions to this Symposium view the issue of
executive power and its constraints in long-term historical perspective.
Jonathan Entin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and David L.
Brennan Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science, traces the
fascinating history of Myers v. United States,10 which he has shown to
be “a most curious case.”11 Demonstrating in concrete and colorful
detail the persistence of debates over executive power in the domestic
realm throughout American history, Dean Entin’s article analyzes
several of the fascinating puzzles presented by the Myers case. First,
why did the case come into existence at all? Second, why was it written
so expansively? And third, what is its true legacy? These questions
seem particularly pertinent in light of the relative insignificance (or at
least the unknown significance) of the employment dispute underlying
it. Ultimately, it seems that here, as elsewhere, pragmatic political
considerations overlapped with more perennial constitutional and
policy concerns, creating precedent of continuing if at times uncertain
importance.
In addition, Peter Strauss, Betts Professor of Law at Columbia
University, places two important recent works on the American Presidency into dialogue with each other: Harold Bruff’s Untrodden Ground:
How Presidents Interpret the Constitution and Heidi Kitrosser’s
Reclaiming Accountability: Transparency, Executive Power, and the
U.S. Constitution.12 Both works attempt to make sense of the

9.

Id. at 953–55; see generally Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State,
725 F.3d 197, 201–03 (D.C. Cir. 2013) cert. granted sub nom. Zivotofsky
ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 134 S. Ct. 1873 (2014).

10.

272 U.S. 52 (1926).

11.

Jonathan L. Entin, The Curious Case of the Pompous Postmaster: Myers
v. United States, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1059 (2015).

12.

Peter L. Strauss, The President and the Constitution, 65 Case W. Res.
L. Rev. 1151 (2015) (citing Harold Bruff, Untrodden Ground:
How Presidents Interpret the Constitution (2015), and Heidi
Kitrosser,
Reclaiming
Accountability:
Transparency,
Executive Power, and the U.S. Constitution (2015)).
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relationship among Presidents, politics, and constitutional interpretation. The former book is focused on the “unmediated” Presidency—
those domains in which the President can act alone—whereas the latter
is focused on the “mediated” Presidency—those areas in which the
President acts through administrative agencies. Thoughtfully reviewing
the different approaches each work takes, Professor Strauss comes to
the conclusion that Presidents’ attitudes toward the Constitution,
which determines the likelihood of preserving an effective but
accountable executive, depend upon a constellation of formal and informal legal norms as well as individual personalities and experiences.
Ultimately, despite the significant changes that the country has
undergone since the Founding, Professor Bruff’s optimistic conclusion,
quoted in Professor Strauss’s review, seems apt: “Overall, the
presidential office in the hands of its occupants has evolved in ways
that seem sufficient to protect both the nation and the rule of law.”13
Finally, reminding us that hard legal constraints matter as well,
two of the Articles in this Symposium focus specifically on legal control
of executive authority. First, Susan Dudley, Director of the George
Washington University Regulatory Studies Center and Research
Professor at the Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public
Administration at George Washington University, concisely but
thoroughly reviews recent efforts, both successful and unsuccessful, to
reform the regulatory process.14 Noting the large array of tools available
for encouraging efficiency and accountability within administrative
agencies, particularly by the judicial and legislative branches, she ends
on a hopeful note, suggesting that the momentum is growing for
concrete and meaningful change.
Turning to a less widely examined area of executive discretion,
Harold Krent, Dean and Professor at the Chicago-Kent College of Law,
analyzes the legal and constitutional constraints on presidential control
over agency adjudication.15 Krent first reviews well-known precedent
suggesting that the President’s appointment and removal authority
may be limited to a greater extent with respect to officials engaged in
judicial functions than with respect to other agency officials. He then
turns to the thorny but intriguing question whether the President’s
managerial control over such judicial officers is similarly limited. Krent
seeks to balance the conflicting imperatives to respect the important
policymaking function of agency adjudication and to protect judicial
independence, along with the rights of individuals challenging agency
action. Thus, he concludes that administrative adjudicators can and
should be insulated from control over, or punishment for, the content
13.

Id. at 1159.

14.

Susan E. Dudley, Improving Regulatory Accountability: Lessons from the
Past and Prospects for the Future, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1027 (2015).

15.

Harold J. Krent, Presidential Control of Adjudication Within the
Executive Branch, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1083 (2015).
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of their decisions, though the executive may exercise other kinds of
managerial control over them.
Taken together, these articles span a wide array of questions
concerning executive power and its limits. They bring nuance and
historical perspective to an issue that is too often disposed of through
superficial snap judgments. And they make an important contribution
to a significant debate that is sure to endure at least into the next two
centuries of our constitutional democracy, just as it has preoccupied
the first two.
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